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I. INTRODUCTION
Our object of inquiry is the English present perfect (PrP), a verbal periphrasis consisting of the present-tense auxiliary have followed by a past-participial VP (e.g. the Eagle has landed). Semantically, the auxiliary can be regarded as a sentential operator (Have) which scopes a context-free past-tense sentence. The truth of the resulting proposition is evaluated for the present interval. For example, (i) is represented as in (2) In (2), the context variables of the past-tense operator have been abstracted, so that the (past) tense in the scope of the perfect operator Have is context free: the time i -the reference point with respect to which anteriority is computed -is not anchored to the time of the utterance event. By contrast, the tense operator immediately scoping Have is context THE ENGLISH PRESENT PERFECT form sentence. The existential PrP, by contrast, evokes not a specific past interval but a present-inclusive time span (general or restricted) within which one or more events of a certain type are located. Likewise, the 'current relevance' rubric can be shown to subsume both a resultant-state implication and a modal notion that has been termed the 'present possibility' requirement.
The contrast between the resultative PrP and preterite is best understood when examined from a diachronic perspective. Historically, we see the development of a discourse-functional opposition between the two closely aligned forms of past-time reference. In Old and Middle English, according to Visser (I966), the two forms -resultative PrP and preterite -were largely interchangeable in both poetry and prose. The diachronic retention of these two exponents of past-time reference can be attributed to the ability of speakers to establish a pragmatic contrast among semantically commensurate forms (Clark I987). The diachronic resolution of 'constructional synonymy' will often involve the interaction of semantic and pragmatic factors: if two distinct constructions are semantically equivalent, these constructions will come to be seen as functionally opposed. These are cases in which 'speakers innovate pragmatic extensions of grammatical forms' (Slobin I990: io).
In Modern English, the resultative PrP and preterite participate in a discourse-pragmatic opposition; the preterite is the unmarked member of this opposition. This opposition arises from the contrast between anaphoric and deictic determination of reference time. The preterite is anaphoric in that preterite-form assertions locate a situation at a 'definite' past interval: a time which has either been previously evoked in the discourse or is contextually recoverable. Preterite-form assertions are said to 'refer back' to a linguistic or extralinguistic temporal antecedent.2 For example, the sentence I went swimming might refer back to the temporal antecedent set up by the preteriteform question What did you do yesterday? In contrast with the preterite, the resultative PrP expresses deictic temporal reference. Sentences like Tve met someone else are used to assert the existence of a presently accessible result [2] In this discussion, we will not consider narrative which entails temporal progression. In such narratives, the reference time of a preterite-form assertion is a time 'just after' the reference time of the previous preterite-form assertion. An example of temporal discourse is given in (i):
(i) Marge walked into the room. She slipped off her shoes.
As Partee (2984) observes, the anaphoric analysis of the preterite is incompatible with the successive updating of the reference time found in narrative texts like (i). The anaphoric properties of the preterite emerge most clearly when we look at texts like (ii):
(ii) I broke my finger. Someone slammed the closet door on it.
In (ii), the reference time of the second sentence can be identified with that of the first sentence. The text in (ii) can be said to exemplify ELABORATION MODE, rather than TEMPORAL-PROGRESSION MODE.
(for example, the current lack of romantic interest in the addressee); they do not require reference to a previously evoked or currently accessible past interval. Certain grammatical constraints upon the resultative PrP, like that related to pragmatic presupposition, can be attributed to its lack of an anaphoric function. I will suggest, however, that the restrictions upon the resultative PrP constriction (RPC) do not follow automatically from any general grammatical or functional principles, whether universal or English specific, and that therefore the resultative PrP qualifies as a FORMAL IDIoM: a morphosyntactic configuration characterized by otherwise unpredictable grammatical constraints and 'dedicated to semantic and pragmatic purposes not knowable from form alone' (Fillmore et al. I988: 505) . Idiomaticity is a matter of degree: the properties of idiomatic form-meaning pairings are MOTIVATED to the extent that they have a precedent elsewhere in the grammar (see Goldberg 1992b). In English, for example, the use of the definite article as a degree marker in formulaic expressions like the better to eat you with is semantically motivated insofar as the definite article is assigned this same function in the so-called comparative conditional (The more, the merrier). The inheritance relations which link constructions are analogous to derivational relationships between words. Derivational links, such as that relating the words collate and collateral, might be tenuous, as might the inheritance relations which link a given construction to one or more formally and semantically similar constructions. In such cases, knowledge of one formmeaning pairing does not relieve the learner of the obligation to learn the related pairing.
The existential and continuative readings of the PrP closely resemble the analogous readings of the PaP; the corresponding constructions are strongly motivated, since adverbial co-occurrence restrictions and interpretive constraints are largely predictable from the relevant semantics, shared by both PaP and PrP forms. In the case of the resultative PrP, however, we find grammatical and pragmatic constraints which a learner would not know simply by knowing that the perfect form may signal that 'the result of an event continues to the reference time'. Therefore, I will presume that the knowledge that speakers use in producing sentences like (6c) is represented as a highly idiomatic pairing of form and meaning: the RPC.
The remainder of this paper will be structured in the following fashion. In the following section, I will present a discourse-pragmatic analysis of the preterite, which will serve as the basis for an account of the discoursefunctional opposition in which the RPC and preterite participate. In section 3, I will present arguments in favor of the claim that the present perfect is ambiguous rather than vague with respect to the three relevant readings. In section 4, I will provide representations of the three semantic structures at issue. In section 5, I will discuss grammatical and discourse-pragmatic reflexes of the existential and resultative readings. In the concluding section, i i6 I will suggest the consequences of this study for a conception of aspectual grammar. Partee (1984) has observed that truth-functional accounts of preterite meaning can be divided into two general types. In both accounts, the pasttense marker is viewed as an operator Past, which scopes a tenseless proposition. The truth of the resulting proposition is evaluated for speech time t. The first type of account, associated with Prior (I967), is that in which a proposition of the form Past (A) evaluates to true iff the tenseless proposition A is true at some time t' earlier than t. In the second type of account, advocated by Reichenbach (1947), a past-tense sentence is interpretable as true or false only relative to a given (past) reference time. Reference time, according to Klein (1992: 535), is 'the time for which, on some occasion, a claim is made'. Partee (I984) observes that under the Priorean view, the truth of the preterite-form assertion depends on the truth of the base sentence at soME time in the past, while under the Reichenbachian view, the truth of a preterite-form assertion depends on the truth of the base sentence at THAT time in the past.
THE PAST TENSE AS ANAPHOR
Most recent formal accounts of tense reference have followed the Reichenbachian view. Reichenbach's account appears preferable because there is evidence which suggests that reference-time specification must be part of the truth conditions of preterite-form sentences. For example, the sentence I bought you a newspaper will be judged false if the base sentence is false at the time that the hearer has in mind (e.g. that morning), despite the fact that the base sentence may be true at some other time (e.g. last year).
In accordance with Partee (op. cit.), I will presume that state predications subsume the relevant reference time. For example, the assertion The suspect had a beard is made relative to a specific past interval, and does not indicate whether the state referred to holds now of the individual denoted by the NP the suspect. In such cases, the past-tense assertion signals that the speaker wishes to vouch for the presence of the denoted state of affairs only during the relevant past interval. What do we mean when we refer to a past interval as THE RELEVANT INTERVAL? Presumably, this is a specific past time which the utterer of the preterite-form sentence has in mind, and believes that the hearer has in mind (or can readily call to mind).
For Hinrichs (I986) and Partee (1984) , among others, the requirement of mutual knowledge of the evoked past interval is captured by a representational system in which this interval is anaphorically bound to a specific time frame that has previously been introduced in the discourse, or is otherwise recoverable from context. Accordingly, some analysts (e.g. Heny 1982) have suggested that the preterite should not be represented by an existential quantifier over past times (as Priorean treatments would have it), but by an anaphorically bound temporal variable. This mode of representation is intended to capture the insight that the past tense 'points to a particular (context-determined) [temporal] location' (Cooper I986: 237).
The analogy between this form of temporal reference and nominal anaphora is tenuous, since, as Partee (I984: 275) admits, '[i]ntuitively, noun phrases "refer" and tenses do not'. It stretches credibility somewhat to suggest that a tense refers to a time in the same way that a noun phrase refers to an individual. Nevertheless, in eventuality-based systems of representation like that of Parsons (I990), times are existentially bound variables, and thereby qualify as individuals, just as episodes (events) qualify as individuals. Therefore, we can speak of the past-tense operator as evoking two temporal individuals: the time of the utterance (represented as a context-sensitive variable), and the past time of occurrence. We can also speak of the time of occurrence as LOCATABLE WITHIN A HISTORY, since a history incorporates a time line: an ordered set of (temporal) individuals. A history is defined as a mental record of events locatable along a linear pathway of temporal intervals leading to the present moment. According to the Hinrichs-Partee model, the interpreter of a past-tense assertion must locate the occurrence time within a history, i.e. an ordered set of times (and attendant situations) whose upper boundary is the present moment.
As in cases of nominal anaphora, the temporal antecedent may be an element of the linguistic context or an element of the extralinguistic context. Linguistic antecedents include frame adverbials like yesterday, reference times evoked by previous past-tense assertions and bound temporal variables evoked by the subordinate clauses of certain habitual sentences. Examples of these three types of antecedents are given in (ga, b):
(9) (a) Yesterday, I got a strange phone call.
(b) Harry threw a party. He got completely sloshed. (c) Whenever he touched the door knob, he got a shock.
In (9a), the preterite-form assertion evokes a past time identified with that denoted by the adverb yesterday. Here, yesterday has a frame-adverbial reading: the time at which the phone call occurred was a time within the set of times describable as yesterday. In (9b), the time of the second preteriteform assertion is interpreted as the time evoked by the first such assertion: the event of Harry's becoming drunk is located within the interval during which Harry gave the party. In (9c), a somewhat different form of anaphoric past-time reference is involved: the past tense predication appearing in the main clause does not evoke a unique time of occurrence, but a temporal variable, introduced by the subordinate-clause predication. Here, two temporal variables are co-bound: the time of each past door-knob-touching event is the time at which a shock was received.
In the case of an extralinguistic temporal antecedent, the time frame with respect to which the preterite-form assertion is interpreted must be recovered (io) I didn't catch the end of your sentence.
The 'historical background' may also include events outside of the immediate context of the discourse. These are events which the interlocutors can access from a shared history at a time when some event which was previously in the offing is known to have occurred. For example, if the speaker and hearer share knowledge that the hearer was to request a raise at some point during the course of the work day, the speaker may ask the following question, upon the hearer's return from work: (iI) How did you do?
The event whose time of occurrence provides the temporal frame of reference for the preterite-form assertion need not be recent, although the event must be salient to the degree that the interpreter can recover the occurrence time. An illustration of this claim is found in an anecdote, told by Charles Fillmore (p.c.), the humorous effect of which arises from the fact that a preterite-form utterance has a remote-past reference time that is nonetheless easily recoverable. Fillmore reports that during a chance encounter on the streets of London, a fellow linguist invited him to a local fish restaurant famous for its plaice (a type of flounder). Fillmore declined the invitation but, upon meeting that same linguist five years later, greeted him with the preterite-form question How was it? (The addressee replied, 'Excellent.') Here, the plaice-consumption event, although certainly not recent vis-a-vis the individual histories available to each of the two speech participants, is salient, because no more recent events transpired within the representation of history HELD IN COMMON by those interlocutors.
In distinguishing between temporal antecedents which are linguistically expressed and those which can be characterized as 'belonging to the discourse context', it is useful to invoke Lambrecht's distinction between identifiability and activation status -a distinction used to describe the mental representations of nominally encoded discourse referents (Lambrecht, I994). I will extend these concepts to the domain of discourse referents representing 'temporal individuals', i.e. occurrence times established in the 'historical record' shared by speaker and addressee. According to Lambrecht, the identifiability parameter 'has to do with the speaker's assessment of whether or not a discourse representation of a particular referent is already stored in the hearer's mind'. The activation parameter concerns the 'speakers assessment of the status of an identifiable referent as "activated", as merely "accessible" or as "inactive" in the mind of the hearer at the time of the speech act'. An ACTIVE CONCEPT iS one which, in the words of Chafe (I987: 22), iS 'currently lit up, a concept in the person's focus of consciousness at a particular moment'.
An entity which is identifiable is one the interlocutors can distinguish from other entities with which it shares properties criterial for category membership. A formal correlate of identifiability is DEFINITENESS, in those languages which have grammaticalized definiteness distinctions. In such languages, the definite article typically indicates that the noun to which it attaches refers to an entity which is contextually the uniquely salient exemplar of the category in question., For example, in the sentence I picked up the package, the definite NP the package refers to an entity for which a shared representation exists in the minds of speaker and addressee. In the case of 'temporal reference', as mentioned, identifiability arises from the ability of speaker and hearer to select the evoked past interval from a time line which forms the basis for a representation of history shared by the interlocutors. The interpreter must be able to LOCATE the relevant interval within that history.
Identifiable referents, according to Lambrecht, may be in any of three activation states: active, accessible or inactive. While an active concept is a focus of the interlocutors' consciousness, an accessible concept is either in the hearer's peripheral consciousness (as construed by the speaker) or is a salient member of a semantic frame that has been invoked in the discourse. A referent may be said to be in the hearer's peripheral consciousness if, for example, it is a salient part of the text-external world. Deictic expressions like those pictures may be said to refer to an accessible referent in sentences like Those pictures sure are ugly, used to describe some pictures on the wall of the addressee's office (where speaker and addressee are both present in the office). An accessible referent, according to Lambrecht, is more readily brought to mind by the interpreter than one which is inactive. With respect to nominal reference, Lambrecht observes that 'the active status of a referent is formally expressed via lack of accentuation and typically (but not necessarily) via pronominal coding of the corresponding linguistic expression'. Inactive or accessible status is accordingly conveyed by accentuation of the referential expression and full lexical coding (the distinction between inactive and accessible status is not linguistically expressed).
In the case of temporal anaphora, we can say that a past period is active when it has already been invoked in the discourse, and accessible when it has not been explicitly invoked but is salient in the extralinguistic context. For example, a preterite-form assertion can be said to invoke an active past interval if the past interval to which the assertion is relativized has already been referred to by a previous past-tense predication (cf. (9b)). A past time of occurrence is accessible if it is contextually recoverable. The temporal individual evoked is in the situational context, and is therefore more easily conjured up in the addressee's mind than one which is entirely inactive. As we observed above, the situational context may be the immediate context of the discourse (e.g. the time of the last discourse contribution in (io)), or it may be some salient portion of the history which leads up to the present discourse, e.g. in (i I), the time during the work day at which the addressee requested a pay raise.
Whether the interval evoked is characterizable as active or as merely accessible in a discourse, it represents a closely circumscribed interval. If the relevant past interval were not circumscribed, one could not locate it at a particular point in a history. In the examples which we have encountered so far, the preterite evokes a past interval that is POINTLIKE. For example, sentence (io) evokes the point in time at which the addressee's last discourse contribution was made. Intuitively, it is odd to refer to the reference time as a point, since we know that the addressee's utterance must have taken time, and that therefore the reference time evoked by (io) qualifies as an interval. However, as Herweg argues (I99I: 982), one cannot distinguish intervals from moments (i.e. degenerate intervals) without considering the time units relevant to the cognizer(s) (see also Talmy I988):
Since on the conceptual level we deal with mental representations of time, ... viewing a period of time as pointlike means that its internal structure is cognitively neglected as a matter of the granularity of perspective taken by the subject. Thus, we allow that one and the same temporal entity be represented as a pointlike or complex time depending on the situation.
In the context of this analysis, 'situation' is to be construed as the particular time line invoked in the mental representation of a history -a representation which the speaker presumes is shared by the hearer. Our analysis of preterite is based on a model in which this representation of history evokes a time line whose fundamental unit of temporal measurement can be characterized as a moment. This model requires that the past moment evoked by the preterite is (a) IDENTIFIABLE (i.e. locatable at a particular point along the time line) and (b) ACTIVE or ACCESSIBLE at the time at which the preterite-form sentence is uttered.
The analysis just offered is somewhat oversimplified, since the preterite may evoke a past period that has internal structure, i.e. is divisible into subperiods. In the following sentences, the past period refereed to is necessarily interpreted as an interval or 'complex time': (I2) (a) Did Karla ever call you? (b) Goldman Sachs interviewed Bruce twice.
In (i2a), the adverb ever denotes a range of times that are potential times at which Karla's calling took place. According to W. Ladusaw (p.c.), ever (like its negative counterpart never) can be used to preempt the inference that I21 a past predication refers to a 'small' (i.e. momentaneous) period: (I 2a) refers to a past interval, e.g. a day. In (i2b), the presence of the frequency adverb twice requires that the past-tense assertion be taken as evoking a period long enough to include two interviewing events. In both (I2a) and (12b), the preterite-form assertion evokes an identifiable past time that is either active or accessible in the discourse context. Sentence (12b) might be used to answer the question What happened last week? Sentence (i2a) might be used to inquire about events that occurred on the addressee's birthday. The birthday might be an accessible time frame in the discourse, i.e. one that has not been explicitly invoked, but is presumed salient to the hearer. In (I2), unlike the previous examples, the 'definite' time invoked by the preterite is a complex time, which includes two or more (potential or actual) event times. However, the sentences in (I2) are like the previous examples in that the past time evoked can be characterized as having a linguistic or extralinguistic temporal antecedent. Therefore, the time frame referred to by the preterite, whether a pointlike or complex time, is a saliently bounded interval that can be placed at a particular location on a time line (i.e. is identifiable) and is either active or accessible in the discourse context.
The circumscribed character of the past time frame invoked by preterite emerges clearly when one contrasts the preterite with the existential PrP. The existential PrP is exemplified in (6b). Consider the contrast pair given in (I 3):
(I3) (a) I went to Paris.
(b) I've been to Paris. Sentence (i 3b) illustrates an idiomatic grammatical property of the existential perfect: the expression be to can be used to mean 'visit'; be to is ruled out for past-tense assertions (*I was to Paris). Sentence (13a) evokes a specific, circumscribed past interval. This sentence may be a response to a question concerning activities that the speaker engaged in during the past summer. This sentence would be anomalous as a discourse-initial assertion. In order to qualify as a felicitous discourse-initial utterance, (I 3a) would require a past-time temporal adverb like in 1992. A frame adverbial of this type would 'activate' a particular past time within a representation of history which the speaker, by uttering (I3a), signal an intention of constructing.
By contrast, sentence (13b) does not evoke an identifiable past interval. The sentence may be used to denote any number of visits to Paris by the speaker. Therefore, the question How many times? would be an appropriate response to (i 3b), but it would not ordinarily be an appropriate response to (I 3a). While each visit to Paris necessarily has a past time of occurrence, the interpretation of (13b), unlike that of (i3a), does not require the interpreter to invoke a particular past time of occurrence. Instead, the interpreter need only envision a general time span, whose upper boundary is the present time, within which the event or events denoted in question took place. The interval itself may be denoted by a time-span adverb like before. Alternatively, the THE ENGLISH PRESENT PERFECT lower boundary of that interval may be denoted by a since-adverbial expression (e.g. since the war ended).
The distinction between the two types of past-time reference exemplified in (I 3) becomes clearer when we look at the interaction of these predication types with frequency adverbials. Notice that if we add the frequency expression three times to each of these sentences, the circumscribed and specific character of the interval evoked in (i3a) is unchanged. That is, (I 3a) still refers to a definite past period (e.g. last year), although this period is not a pointlike time but a complex time -an interval containing several visits to Paris. In the case of (I 3b), however, the times at which visits to Paris took place are not placed within any temporal boundaries; the event time or times are simply located prior to speech time. An example analogous to (I3) is found below: (I4) (a) Did Karla ever call you? (= (12a)) (b) Has Karla ever called you?
In (14b), ever refers to an interval which effectively lacks a lower boundary. The speaker's inquiry can be said to concern the history of the addressee's friendship with Karla. In (04a), by contrast, the speaker's inquiry concerns only a limited period prior to speech time. While the most likely response to (14a) would be a simple affirmation or denial, the most likely response to (14b) would include a frequency expression like several times. This is a reflection of the fact that preterite form sentences are ordinarily taken to refer to unique past events -since the reference times involved are closely circumscribed -while sentences like (I4b) evoke any number of instances of the event type denoted, since the past period invoked is a broad expanse of time.
Another distinction between the preterite and the existential PrP involves a feature which I will treat as a conventional implicature: the presentpossibility constraint. According to McCawley (I97i), among others, the existential PrP requires that the event or episode denoted by the VP complement be capable of occurring at the present time. Examples (I5a, b) demonstrate that the present-possibility constraint does not characterize the preterite:
(15) (a) I went to a Neil Young concert.
(b) I've been to a Neil Young concert (before).
In sentence (i 5a), the indefinite NP a Neil Young concert refers to a specific performance, which took place at a definite past interval. In sentence (Isb), however, the NP a Neil Young concert refers not to a specific performance but to a type of performance (one given by Neil Young). Sentence (I5b) asserts that within an interval upper bounded by the present, there were one or more instances of the event denoted by the base sentence I go to a Neil Young concert. This sentence conventionally implicates that the event denoted could recur at the present time. Therefore, Neil Young must be alive at present, capable of giving performances, etc. No such implication is attached to (I 5b): this assertion is felicitous if Neil Young is deceased, if he has retired from touring, etc.
There are (at least) two classes of exceptions to the analysis of the preterite offered above. In the first class, described by Heny (1982) In (i8), the preterite-form assertion apparently refers to a present state of affairs: the addressee's knowledge of the speaker's lack of interest; the sentence implies that this state of affairs is the result of a past event: the I24 speaker's reporting his or her lack of interest to the addressee. Here, the adverb already, which ordinarily accompanies state predications, anchors the reference time of the assertion to the present. The usage exemplified here is, as frequently noted, mainly confined to American dialects of English, in which the preterite appears to be expanding its semantic range at the expense of the RPC. Sentence (i9) is ambiguous, in that it can be taken as an argument-focus response to the question Who died yesterday? or as a 'sentence-focus response' to a question like What happened in the news yesterday? (see Lambrecht, I994). In the context which I have in mind, however, (I9) is a sentence-focus assertion, and no past interval has been invoked in the discourse context. Accordingly (I9) may be a discourse-initial utterance, in which case the speaker is simply reporting a momentous event to the addressee. On this reading, sentence (i9) has a function like that of the 'hot news' PrP. In sum, neither ( Instead, I will presume that the ' anaphoric' use of the past tense is one of the communicative functions of the past tense, but not its only function. Let us propose that there is a feature [? anaphoric] which attaches to all exponents of past-time reference in a given language. A form which expresses a past-tense relation will be regarded as [+ anaphoric] iff it requires the interpreter to ' anchor' the event expressed by the base sentence to a ' definite' past interval, i.e. an interval which is both active and identifiable. I will presume that the English past tense is unmarked with respect to the anaphoricity feature: it is capable of expressing both anaphoric and nonanaphoric past-time reference. Below, I will argue that the resultative PrP participates in a markedness opposition with the preterite, in which the resultative PrP is marked as [-anaphoric].
We will now proceed to examine the distinct readings of the PrP, exemplified in (6), after which we will look at those properties of grammar and use which are unique to the resultative reading. The next section will provide evidence that the PrP is ambiguous rather than vague with respect to the relevant readings. 
Have you seen my slippers?
To a question of this sort, the argument goes, only an uncooperative hearer would respond: Yes, about a month ago. That is, the questioner presumably intends a resultative understanding of (20): she is inquiring about a past sighting of the slippers which currently affects the hearer's ability to locate the slippers. The questioner does not intend an existential understanding, i.e. an interpretation which might cause the hearer to mention one or more slipper sightings in the distant past, having no importance for the present state of things. The contextual effects observable here are, however, reducible to relevance-based implicature, together with inference related to the temporary nature of a given slipper location. The interpreter of the PrP-form question (20) will recognize that the only relevant response is one which concerns the questioner's current quandry: the need to find her slippers. This response entails a resultative interpretation of the question. Furthermore, since the conversants know that slippers and other such objects typically remain in a given location only briefly, they also know that the hearer's knowledge of the present location of the slippers will depend upon the hearer's having sighted them recently. Therefore, the resultative reading of a PrP-form utterance does not depend upon the interpreter's awareness that the event denoted is recent. Rather, recency of the event with respect to speech time is intrinsic to the resultative interpretation IN CERTAIN SCENARIOS, like that described as the context for (20).
Recency is not a necessary condition for the adduction of the resultative interpretation. Consider sentence (2I): (2 I) It seems Grandpa has cut me out of the will. Sentence (2 I) can be construed resultatively even in a context in which the disinheriting event occurred many years prior to the reporting of it, so long as certain effects of that event (penury, etc.) are in force at speech time. Sentence (2I) shows that the causal event denoted by the RPC need not be recent.
Perhaps I asked what (the hell) she had asked.
Zwicky & Sadock point out that the idiomatic expression the hell, placed after the wh-complementizer/relativizer, ensures that (23) receives an indirect-question reading rather than a headless-relative reading. Therefore, they argue, the construction exemplified in (23) is ambiguous rather than vague with respect to the two understandings, since an idiosyncratic (i.e. non semantically motivated) grammatical feature will generally attach only to a conventional (i.e. non context-dependent) understanding.
Vagueness analyses like Klein's fail to countenance grammatical facts of the sort to be explored here. It is difficult to imagine how one might reconcile the claim that the PrP is semantically unambiguous with the fact that, for example, the existential understanding is compatible with manner modification while the resultative understanding is not. Consider the following example:
(24) (a) Our committee chair has (??angrily) tendered his resignation.
(b) Our committee chair has angrily tendered his resignation every time we have asked him to take a controversial stand on something.
These examples indicate that the existential-resultative distinction is a conventional one, since it has a grammatical reflex (i.e. a co-occurrence restriction) which is not predictable from the two meanings involved. The argument here is similar to Zwicky & Sadock's claim about (23). Admittedly, however, the fact that the distinct perfect understandings have distinct cooccurrence constraints does not necessarily obviate a vagueness analysis. The PrP readings in (6) can be regarded as products of the interaction between a vague PrP meaning (perhaps including 'current relevance') and the lexical specifications which 'fill in' the construction. Under this analysis, the distinct readings of the PrP arise via constructional accommodation. According to Bauer (1970) Despite the attractive simplicity of this solution, the 'algorithm' summarized in (25) is inadequate in many respects. In general, it is difficult to maintain an accommodation-style vagueness analysis in light of the fact that the PrP construction is characterized by TOKEN AMBIGUITY. Let us say that a construction exhibits token ambiguity if a set of understandings attributable to a grammatical template outside of any lexical context is also available when that template has been 'filled in' by lexical material. As an example of a construction exhibiting token ambiguity, let us take the wayconstruction, described by Jackendoff (I990) and Goldberg (1992b). Jackendoff points out that sentences like the following are ambiguous between 'causative' and 'manner' interpretations: Sentence (29) might be used by one party guest to another, as the two wait on the front porch of their host's home -the hearer has just arrived, while the speaker has been waiting for several minutes. Given the interlocutors' knowledge of hailing conventions, the sentence is used to convey a result of the following sort: we should now expect our host to be receiving us. There While sentence (30) entails the presence of a clean car at speech time, it might also be used to negotiate further consequences of that resultant state (the hearer must now pay the speaker, etc.).5 Examples like (30) lead us to the conclusion that the resultant state entailed by the RPC is contextually determined (see also Fenn 1987; Parsons I990); the constructional semantics specify only that soME resultant state obtains. Complement-verb telicity will occasionally enable the interpreter to adduce the relevant result, but, as shown by (29) , that cue is not necessarily in evidence. In such cases, as we will see in the next section, the result in force at speech time is simply that situation which is potentially significant to the interlocutors in their joint determination of immediate goals. I will argue that where a present resultant state has no role in determining an imminent course of action, that state is a poor candidate for presentation via the RPC.
Analyses like Brinton's do not therefore succeed in reducing PrP readings to the interaction of constructional and lexical semantics. They do, however, underscore the fact that the mere presence of co-occurrence restrictions uniquely associated with one or the other of the readings is a poor diagnostic for ambiguity. As Zwicky & Sadock (I975) argue, ambiguity claims based upon this type of diagnostic (which they refer to as the ' added material' test) fail when the distinct co-occurrence possibilities are semantically nonarbitrary, and the lexical material in question actually induces rather than reflects the distinct understandings at issue. The present analysis does not rest upon this unreliable ambiguity test. First, the diagnostics based upon pragmatic presupposition and event sequencing do not make reference to cooccurrence restrictions. Second, while manner and time adverbs do represent In both (32a) and (32b), the since-adverbial expression denotes the lower boundary of a time span whose upper boundary is speech time. Mittwoch In (35), the three-year period must be denoted by an in-headed expression of temporal extent. While for-headed durational adverbs do not have an existential reading like the comparable reading of since-adverbials, they can I34 co-occur with the existential PrP. As we saw in the previous section, sentences like (27) are ambiguous between continuative and existential readings. Sentence (27) is repeated below, along with the relevant readings: (27) Harry has been in Bali for two days. continuative: Harry's presence in Bali obtains for all times within a present-inclusive time span whose lower bound is two days ago. existential: There were one or more visits to Bali by Harry within a present-inclusive time span; each of these visits lasted two days. His argument is based on the truth conditions which he assigns to the perfect, which require that the base sentence be true at a NONFINAL subinterval of the interval for which the perfect sentence itself is evaluated. If the overall interval is a present-inclusive past period, the base sentence (Harry be-in Bali) must be true at some time prior to now. In the case of (35b), 'now' is a two-year interval, and each subinterval of that period is an evaluation time. As a consequence, at each subinterval of the two-year period, the proposition Have (Harry be-in Bali) must be true at some nonfinal subinterval. predications in that they lack the subinterval property: no subinterval of Harry's being in the basement for ten minutes is an instance of that whole episode. Since speech time is conceived of as an instant by convention, and since events (including state-phase events) are not instantiated at any single moment of the interval in which they occur, to assert the existence of an event is to report its culmination. Therefore, in English, neither event predications nor bounded-state predications are amenable to present-tense reporting, e.g.
*Harry is illfor two days.
The scope assignment in (36b) requires that the interpreter evaluate the truth of a tenseless state-phase proposition (Have [Harry be in Bali]) for speech time. However, as we saw above, speech time is a moment, and an event proposition cannot be said to be true at a single moment alone. Therefore, (36b) is ill formed. It should be noted that Mittwoch's analysis does not fall prey to the objection just made. Mittwoch does maintain that the continuative involves a durational adverb having wide scope with respect to the perfect operator; however, she gives truth conditions for the continuative perfect that would require that (27), on the continuative reading, be evaluated at the end of Harry's stay in Bali. This endpoint is the present time. Given this type of analysis, however, I see no need to recognize a wide scoping of the durational vis-a-vis the perfect operator. Instead, the continuative can be assigned the same scoping as the existential, in which the duration adverb has narrow scope with respect to the perfect operator. The ambiguity exemplified in (27) In the case of (38), we must account for the speaker's intuition that the state of Paul's living in Boulder will probably continue past now, and may have obtained prior to i989. Given the revised definition of state phase, we can say that a person choosing to utter (38) is directing his or her attention to a single period at which a state holds, while disregarding times outside that period at which the state may hold as well.
While ( (48) (a) I put your shoes in the closet, but they're not there now.
(b) I have put your shoes in the closet, *but they're not there now. Both sentences assert that the speaker placed the shoes in a particular location, and implicate that the shoes now reside in that location. In the case of (48a), however, the resultant-state implication is akin to a generalized quantity-based implicature: the assertion is relevant and/or informative only insofar as the event described has some present consequences. While the resultant-state implication attached to the preterite-form assertion is DEFEASIBLE (Levinson I983) , that attached to a present-perfect form assertion is not.
The existential and continuative PrPs can have resultant-state implications like that linked to the preterite in (49a):
(49) (a) I've read De Oratore three times (so I can explain it to you).
(b) I've been ill (so I haven't gotten around to it).
The resultant-state implications attached to (49a, b) are evoked by a hearer attempting to discern the relevance of the PrP-form assertion. The sentences in (49) can be regarded as instances in which two PrP readings are mutually compatible (see Norvig I988). For example, (49a) has both existential and resultative readings: three reading events have occurred and, as a consequence, the reader now has knowledge of the text in question.
As noted earlier, the result state whose existence is conventionally implicated by the RPC is not necessarily determined by the linguistic context. The present result which the speaker wishes to call attention to is not always akin to the outcome coded by a telic VP-complement. Sentence (29), repeated below, illustrates that resultant states can be computed for PrP sentences which contain atelic VP-complements: (29) I have knocked (so someone should be coming, etc.).
In general, the interpreter of an RPC construct must compute the relevant result on the basis of extralinguistic and linguistic cues (e.g. the outcome, if any, entailed by the Aktionsart of the participial complement) Only lexically encoded end-states will be subject to the defeasibility test applied (48).
McCawley's contradictory test demonstrates that when one negates a resultative PrP, one is negating only the existential assertion that the denoted event occurred. This fact, however, need not be taken as indicating that the resultative reading is reducible to the existential reading. One can instead presume that the resultative interpretation attaches to affirmative sentences only. This constraint has an obvious semantic motivation. In negating the sentence I have broken my arm, one necessarily denies the existential assertion. This in turn removes the possibility that the resultant-state implicatum can be satisfied; the resultant state could not possibly obtain, as the requisite causal event did not occur.
The resultant-state implicatum incorporates a pragmatic variable: it can be viewed as a directive to the interpreter to find in the context, linguistic or extralinguistic, a method of relating the past event denoted to some feature of the present situation characterizable as a consequence of that event. As Li et al (I98i) observe with respect to the Mandarin perfect marker le, the presentation of a present result often represents a demand for action (including a verbal response) from the hearer. Consider, for example, the following sentence:
(50) My car has been stolen.
In (50), the absence of the car is evoked as potential catalyst for future action (e.g. phoning the police). The resultant state is that situation which determines what happens next (Slobin I990). That is, the resultant state inferred by the hearer on the basis of the PrP-form assertion is not only the current absence of the car, but also the fact that something must be done about the absence of the car. Since some resultant states represent situations requiring immediate resolution, the felicity of the resultative PrP will often depend upon recency of the participial-VP denotatum vis-'a-vis speech time. ' 
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Notice that (5) would not be an appropriate response to a questioner seeking to know, a week or so after the theft, why the speaker is driving a rental car. The resultant state arising from an event may last indefinitely, but represent a temporary situation from the point of view of 'crisis management': the resultant state (qua actionable situation) will cease once the interlocutors have determined a strategy for reckoning with the consequent crisis, although the situation which precipitated that crisis (e.g. the absence of the car) may not cease. The anomaly of (52) can be attributed to the restriction stated in (53):
GRAMMATICAL REFLEXES OF EXISTENTIAL-RESULTATIVE
(53) The RPC cannot be used to further describe ('elaborate upon') a pragmatically presupposed event.
Both Comrie (1976) and Dinsmore (I98I) have proposed versions of (53), although both authors fail to recognize, as we will recognize, that this constraint attaches to the RPC rather than to the PrP per se. One can see further manifestations of (53) In (54), the speaker is both establishing the occurrence of an event (of ankle breaking) and simultaneously providing some information about that event (it occurred during skiing). In (55), by contrast, speaker B is responding to an utterance which licenses the assumption that the recent occurrence of a fracture is knowledge common to the interlocutors. The response, therefore, provides further information about that pragmatically presupposed event. As such, it cannot appear in PrP form.
There are certain grammatical constructions dedicated to providing or requesting additional information about a pragmatically presupposed state of affairs. Among these constructions are clefts, as noted, and wh-questions.9
[9] The RPC is not necessarily incompatible with wh-questions requesting information about circumstances surrounding the event denoted by the VP-complement. In particular, we find that who-questions like the following are acceptable:
(i) Who has made this terrible mess?
Here, the wh-question is used to request the identity of the agent responsible for the past action denoted, presumably presupposing the open proposition x made this terrible mess. Exceptions like (i) may be attributable to a general property of who-questions: such questions may require that the addressee accommodate to the relevant presupposition, rather than necessarily exploiting shared knowledge of that presuppositional material. Lambrecht (994), for example, cites cases like the following:
(ii) Who wants a cookie?
The speaker of (ii) cannot be said to be accessing the presupposition that someone in fact wants a cookie; the question in some sense simply induces the hearer or hearers to behave 'as if' this As predicted, neither construction type readily accepts the RPC, as shown in (56) and (57):
(56) Don't thank ME. # It's HARRY who's selected the wine.
(57) #Where have you found my watch?
With specific classes of predicates, nominal definiteness and pronominal anaphora will evoke a pragmatically presupposed event; the RPC will accordingly be proscribed. As Dinsmore points out (I98I) one such class of predicates are verbs of creation. When the direct object denotes a unique created item, a PrP denoting an event of creation has a resultative rather than existential interpretation, since a given act of creation is not replicable. An NP invoking an existential presupposition will, when serving as the object of a verb of creation, require pragmatic presupposition of the creation event. Notice the contrast between (58) and (59) Similar effects are observable among verbs of transfer, where a linguistically uninstantiated recipient role is filled by the speaker. When the theme argument of such a verb is coded by a definite or pronominal NP, this signals that the coded entity is IDENTIFIABLE. Recall that an identifiable entity is 'one for which a shared representation already exists in the speaker's and hearer's mind at the time of the utterance' (Lambrecht, 1994) . With respect to an item transferred toward the interlocutors, identifiability stems from the availability of that item to the recipients, i.e. its placement at the deictic center. Availability in turn entails that the occurrence of the transfer event is pragmatically presupposed. Use of the PrP is accordingly ruled out in such contexts.. Consider (6o) and (6i):
proposition were shared knowledge. Similarly, in the case of (i), the knowledge that someone made this particular terrible mess (and that there is in fact such a mess) cannot be said to be shared by speaker and addressee. The utterer of (i) is in fact directing the attention of the addressee to a mess that has not previously come under discussion. In cases in which the event proposition is necessarily shared knowledge, questions about agent identity cannot be expressed by means of the RPC: This constraint does not appear to be an arbitrary one when we assume that the RPC cannot express anaphoric temporal reference. The nonanaphoric nature of the resultative PrP is shown by the fact that it cannot be used to invoke an extralinguistic temporal antecedent. In section 2, we
[io] The reader is asked to ignore a reading of (6i) in which the NP the fruitcake has a type reading. Since the article in this case would be a generic article, rather than one indicating a uniquely identifiable referent, (6i) would not presuppose the transfer of the theme to the deictic center. Instead, given a type reading of the NP the fruitcake, we would be inclined to see (6i) as an event-reporting sentence.
noticed that the preterite -when operating in an anaphoric capacity -may evoke an extralinguistic temporal antecedent. For example, the preteriteform assertion in (65) evokes the time of the discourse contribution immediately prior:
(65) I didn't hear. I had the water running. The extralinguistic antecedent may be the time of an event whose occurrence in the text-external world is thought to be salient:
(66) Did you see that huge wasp fly by? In (66), the time evoked by the preterite-form question is not that of a recent discourse contribution, but rather the time of an event which is presumed salient within the shared past experience of the interlocutors. Notice that the RPC is unavailable in the contexts described:
(67) (a) #1I haven't heard. I had the water running.
(b) #Have you seen that huge wasp fly by?
Both (67a) and (67b) have potential nonresultative interpretations. In (67a), the PrP-form assertion is likely to be interpreted as a continuative PrP: the addressee's last discourse contribution is framed as a state phase whose duration is included within the period during which the water was running. In this case, the PrP-form assertion can be paraphrased in the following way: I haven't heard what you've been saying for the past few minutes. That is, all times at which the addressee was speaking are times at which the water was running. This interpretation is unavailable in a context in which the addressee's inaudible contribution was, say, a monosyllabic response to a yes-no question previously posed by the speaker.
In (67b), the PrP-form assertion has a possible existential reading, in which the speaker presupposes that the wasp is a regular visitor, and that one or more sightings have already occurred. In this case, the relevant reading is evoked by the presence of yet or before. These examples, along with example (64), demonstrate that (53) does not characterize the PrP per se. This constraint is a parochial restriction associated with the RPC.
Although (53) has a discourse-pragmatic motivation, viz. the anaphoricity contrast between the RPC and preterite, (53) would not be predictable solely from knowledge of this contrast. Sentences like (62) show that reference to a pragmatically presupposed event is in fact permitted in content questions which seek further information about present resultant states. Furthermore, knowledge of the anaphoricity contrast would not enable the learner to infer apparently inexplicable exceptions to constraint (53). One exception involves why-questions. Consider the contrast between (68) and (69) It is difficult to understand, a priori, why the question in (68) should welcome the RPC, while the apparently synonymous question (69) does not. constraint (53) has exceptions which must be learned; the particulars of (53) cannot therefore be predicted from the anaphoricity restriction upon the RPC exemplified in (67). Nevertheless, the fact that the RPC is marked as [-anaphoric] provides a reasonable 'after the fact' explanation for the existence of (53) 'Cyclic' time adverbials contribute to the characterization of an event type that can recur at present. For example, presuming that Harry is still alive, etc., the event of Harry's arriving on Tuesday can be duplicated on the specified day of the week in which (7ob) is uttered. Since speech time is the time for which one presumes that replication of the vent is possible, speech time must be an interval that is large enough to accommodate any token of the cyclic time specified. In (7ob), for example, this interval is equated with the current week; the time at which Harry's arrival can be repeated is the implicates that this event can still occur. Sentence (72) cannot, however, be used at two or three in the afternoon to assert the present existence of a walked dog, panting or enervated as a result of having been exercised by Harry at noon that day. The RPC-based constraint against specification of event time is amenable to a post hoc semantico-pragmatic explanation. Since the RPC is [-anaphoric] it cannot be used to 'corefer' with an adverbial antecedent'; the RPC cannot usurp the anaphoric function of the preterite. However, the constraint barring a resultative reading of (72) appears to be an idiosyncratic one. As noticed by Binnick (i99i) and Comrie (1976) Ernst points out that a number of adverbs, like appropriately, may function as either sentence or predicate modifiers: we find both Appropriately, Carol handled Jay's lawsuit and Carol handled Jay's lawsuit appropriately. In the former case, a contextual norm is computed for possible eventualities. In the latter case, a contextual norm is computed for possible manners of performing the action in question.
Certain manner adverbs encoding rapidity, like quickly, present an apparent problem for this scheme. While quickly can refer to the manner in which the agent executed an action (as in She spoke very quickly), it can also refer to the speed with which an event culminated following another event.
In the latter case, VP-initial position is preferred: When Marge's unexpected guests arrived, Irving quickly made a quiche (versus ?made a quiche quickly).
Here, we need not infer that making of the quiche involved rapid movements on Irving's part, etc.; we simply adduce that there was a shorter-than-average time lag between the event of the guests' arrival and the point at which the making of the quiche culminated. In such cases, quickly appears synonymous with immediately. Therefore, adverbs like quickly do not yield unequivocal results with respect to the interaction of RPC and manner modification. Notice that resultative sentences like the following are ruled out:
(77) *The committee has quickly rejected my proposal.
If, however, quickly in (77) is taken to be synonymous with immediately, then the anomaly of (77) can be attributed to the fact that evocation of an anterior reference-point (i.e. an event prior to the rejection event) is incompatible with the resultative reading of the PrP. As we saw in section 5.2, the occurrence time of the complement-verb denotatum cannot be specified. This means that this event cannot be temporally located by means of a pasttime adverb like at noon or by means of 'indirect' temporal specification: visa-vis an anterior past reference point. The adverb quickly, on the immediately reading, necessarily evokes a point with respect to which the encoded action represents a rapid subsequent development. This point is 'virtually' a reference time for the subsequent event. Accordingly, sentences like the following are anomalous: (78) *1 sent in an excellent proposal and those cretins have quickly rejected it.
Here, the time of bringing in the proposal is the anterior reference point with respect to which rejection represents a rapid eventuality. The anterior event represents a temporal anchor for the event denoted by the PrP. Notice that in the absence of the adverb quickly, which establishes a temporal link between the sending and rejection events, the sentence is acceptable. Existential PrPs, which are not constrained by the time-specification constraint, accept manner modification of the immediately type: (79) Whenever he has brought in something unusual, the committee has quickly rejected his proposal.
In (79), the reference point is the event of bringing in something unusual. The reference-point event may be contextually evoked, in sentences like the following: Harvard has typically rejected me immediately. This sentence may be uttered in a situation in which the hearer is aware of a set of time points at which the speaker submitted an application to Harvard; the speaker asserts the rejection occurs immediately after each of the contextually evoked submission events. Sentences (84) and (85) are interpretable only as existential PrPs. That is, the sentences assert that there are a number of eventualites of a given type into continuative, resultative and existential varieties: in the case of the continuative PrP, the culmination of a state phase immediately prior to the current moment; in the case of the RPC, the current presence of a resultant state; in the case of the existential PrP, the current replicability of an event. These three varieties of current relevance are regarded as distinct perfect readings, described by the logical representations (36), (39) and (46).
In this paper, I have proposed that these readings are manifested as distinct grammatical constructions. Evidence for this proposal is provided by grammatical restrictions unique to expressions encoding the resultative reading (39). The RPC, as envisioned, will serve as the locus of all idiosyncratic restrictions discussed here: those pertaining to pragmatic presupposition of E, temporal specification of E, 'pluralization' of E and manner modification of E. I have suggested that constraints related to temporal-adverb modification and pragmatic presupposition can be attributed to the discourse-pragmatic opposition between RPC and preterite -an opposition which involves the feature [ ? anaphoric]. I have also argued that all constrains described here can be regarded as instances of a general restriction whereby the RPC fails to unify with constructions which imbue the event denoted by the VP complement with an undue degree of salience vis-a-vis its currently accessible consequences.
The availability of discourse-pragmatic and semantic modes of explanation for the observed constraints should not, however, be taken as evidence that these constraints are predictable or 'follow from' the semantics a priori. There is no necessary incompatibility between asserting the current existence of a resultant state and elaborating upon circumstances surrounding the causal event. Furthermore, as we saw in section 5.I, the RPC does not necessarily bar anaphoric past-time reference; there are exceptions to constraint (53). I presume therefore that the constraints discussed in section 5 must simply be learned along with the RPC. This is not to say that the speaker fails to recognize that these constraints have a semantic and discourse-pragmatic basis. In all likelihood, however, this recognition represents after-the-fact inferencing, in the sense of Goldberg (1992b): abductive reasoning applied by speakers attempting to 'make sense' of the input forms. The availability of a semantic motivation, as well as knowledge of a system of discourse-functional oppositions, will serve as a mnemonic aid for the learner attempting to master those constraints upon grammar and usage associated with the RPC.
This case study suggests that there is no necessary distinction between the so-called literal meaning of a construct and the conditions governing the felicitious use of that form in discourse. Here, we have examined two such conditions associated with the RPC. First, the RPC evokes a form of pasttime reference that is nonanaphoric. One manifestation of this restriction is the constraint stated in (53): the RPC cannot be used to 'elaborate upon' a pragmatically presupposed event proposition. Second, the RPC is typically of aspectual construction are determined within a system of universal semantic contrasts and language-particular discourse-functional oppositions.
